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Book Review of 
Reconstructing Economic Theory: 
The Problem of Human Agency, 
by Allen Oakley 
 
 
John B. Davis 





The premise of Oakley's recent book is that the concept and 
representation of the individual in mainstream economic theory is 
sufficiently unrealistic and inadequate that rather than another critique 
of this concept what is most needed is a pre-substantive, 
metatheoretical investigation of the ontological foundations of what it 
means to be a human agent. He undertakes this project pursuant to a 
larger aim of reconstructing economic theory as a more humanistic 
economics, and envisages a three-stage inquiry that includes, first, an 
examination of what is distinctive about human agency, second, 
attention to the consequent methodological requirements this implies, 
and third, a treatment of the epistemology this would entail. 
Reconstructing Economic Theory is devoted to the first of these stages, 
seen as prior and most fundamental. Oakley believes this investigation 
properly belongs within an agency-structure framework, but puts aside 
detailed consideration of the social, institutional, and other structural 
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influences operating on individuals to analyze human agency in terms 
of what he characterizes as typical inherited and given situations 
(pp. 3-4). He then gives critical primacy to three principles that 
operate – albeit in a highly constricted manner - in mainstream 
economics' positivist metatheory: folk psychology, agent rationality, 
and situational analysis. The book is thus devoted to providing a 
deeper investigation of these principles, and this is carried out in 
connection with the examination of the ideas of four individuals who 
Oakley regards as having made important contributions to 
understanding the ontological character of human agency: Alfred 
Schutz, Karl Popper, George Shackle, and Herbert Simon. In effect, 
the book constitutes groundwork for a full theory of the human agent 
based on this motivated survey. The introductory and concluding 
chapters provide overview and synthesis, but the bulk of the 
discussion is dedicated to seven chapters on these four individuals. I 
briefly review these discussions in order to show their thread, and 
provide a basis for comment on Oakley's general project. 
 
The focus for Schutz is the subjective or actor's point of view as 
contrasted with the perspective of the social scientist. Individual 
agents are isolated, self-conscious beings able to bracket out the world 
about them in reflexively attending to their own streams of 
consciousness. To order their worlds they engage in a process of 
typification whereby they give meaning to their social locations and 
intersubjective relationships with others. Intersubjective relationships 
are themselves characterized in terms of distance, ranging from those 
who are close enough that subjective experiences are shared to those 
who are only functional types. Oakley sees Schutz's framework as 
sympathetic to the general principles of situational analysis in its 
emphasis on individuals choosing and acting in conditioned and 
structured environment, but he faults Schutz for not giving that 
environment detailed investigation. He also praises Schutz for seeing 
human cognition as limited in virtue of subjective perspective and 
experience, but sees him as failing to consider how individuals might 
respond to their knowledge being incomplete and fallible. Combining 
these criticisms, Oakley would like to see more attention to the 
complex and often conflictual nature of social strucmres, and how 
individuals negotiate them. 
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Popper, then, with situational analysis as the centerpiece of his 
understanding of human agency, is the natural figure to rum to for a 
finer appreciation of the ontology of situated agency. Moreover, Oakley 
believes, much of the examination, critical or otherwise, of Popper's 
situational analysis has emphasized him as a methodologist of science 
to the neglect of the ontological content of Popper's writings. This is 
thus pursued through an examination of Popper's emphasis on 
individuals being free and autonomous and in terms of his three-
worlds representation of the human situation, which Oakley believes 
particularly valuable in providing potential foundations for an onto 
logically informed situational analysis. In the three-worlds view, world 
1 is physical reality, world 2 is all our subjective processes, and world 
3 is all the accumulated and recorded products of human intellecmal 
activity. World 2 is positioned between worlds 1 and 3. Oakley allows 
that this vision is only a simple sketch, but also believes exposing its 
limits creates possibilities for augmenting it so as to make allowance 
for the “shortfalls in agents' relevant knowledge and for deficiencies in 
their cognitive capacities, for the complexity and temporality of the 
circumstances with which agents must contend, and for the intricate 
social, institutional and other dimensions of the situations” in which 
they operate (p. 79). 
 
These last words are an obvious introduction to Shackle, whose 
ideas are next discussed. Oakley is particularly interested in Shackle 
as having defined economics as a humanistic social science, where this 
particularly involves the idea that human agents are subjective beings 
who are existentially free and creative though who also have limited 
knowledge and cognitive capacities. This creativity is associated with 
the problem of future time and the consequent need for imagination in 
decision-making. Shackle was of course also a relentless critic of 
neoclassical theory which he saw as infected with mechanical notions 
and reasoning. At the same time, Oakley argues, Shackle's vision of 
time and uncertainty was so radical as to render the individual an 
isolated, solitary being. He was, that is, “no social ontologist” (p. 146), 
but one who failed to explain situational conditioning as an objective 
dimension to choice and action. This led him at times to the 
unfortunate recourse of suggesting strategies for formalizing the 
behavioral functions in his models of choice, a notion entirely at odds 
with the main emphasis in his thinking. Shackle thus posed crucial 
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questions associated with the ontological character of human 
subjectivity, but he did so in such strong terms as to make nihilism the 
message. Inadvertently, then, he points us toward the question of how 
we are to understand human situatedness.  
 
Thus last taken up is Simon, who at the outset of his career 
explicitly argued that understanding individuals' cognitive and 
knowledge limitations also entailed developing a theory of 
organizations which provide human agents prestructured and reliable 
frameworks of action. Oakley notes that later in life Simon admitted he 
“backed away from studying organizations and big economic systems” 
to focus more on individual decision-making (Simon 1986, 24), but 
nonetheless treats Simon's conception of human agency as situated 
agency, and argues that it is from this perspective that his thinking 
about procedural and bounded rationality should be viewed. Indeed, 
Simon's increasing hostility as his career progressed to 'armchair 
economics' that ignored the evidence regarding how individuals 
actually made decisions continually reminds us of the social context in 
which decision-making occurs. Thus the limits of rationality, he 
argued, are associated with the “goal identifications” agents have, 
which are themselves a product of their locations in organizations. 
Social roles, moreover, are adaptive and emergent dimensions of 
agents' actions, rather than determining. All this, clearly, is an 
advance on providing a sound situational analysis metatheory for 
economics. Oakley has few hesitations, then, about Simon's 
contribution, though he does note that Simon errs in missing the 
ontological nature of limitations on individual action, and that Simon's 
observations are often highly programmatic.  
 
Where, then, does this tour of contributions yet half-steps leave 
us? Oakley uses his last chapter to draw together the threads. The 
broad themes reviewed include real time, self-consciousness, limited 
cognitive capacity, typification, imagination, contingency, and 
situatedness. But it is the last theme to which he has continually been 
pointing in his review of those contributors who for all their insights 
never entirely grasp, he believes, that radical human subjectivity is 
ultimately meaningless - perhaps nihilistic - apart from an attention to 
social structures which frame it. What, then, can complete this partial 
picture they offer? Here, Oakley introduces, at almost the last 
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moment, the work of Anthony Giddens (pp. 201-208), a leading 
proponent of agency-structure thinking, as a possible framework for 
explaining situatedness. Giddens understands social structure to 
exercise both enabling and constraining effects on human agents 
which are exhibited in terms of dual-sided accounts of rules and social 
identities. For Oakley the key in this is the idea of “a balance in the 
origins of human conduct between existential, psychologically based 
contingency and situational containment” (p. 208). He then closes his 
discussion with strong reminders that there remains a high degree of 
contingency in human action reflecting the inescapably open nature of 
our choices. 
 
But has he, in fact, shown us what is involved in a balance 
between subjectivity and social constraint? Giddens' enabling-
constraining reasoning is at such a high level of generality as to be 
virtually incontestable. Social structures influence action and vice 
versa. Even neoclassical economists could subscribe to this. The idea 
of a “balance” between “existential, psychologically based contingency 
and situational containment” (p. 208) is itself largely metaphorical, 
and, as it turns, out there is little in Oakley's remaining discussion that 
tells us how such a balance might be understood. He does appear to 
have a view of how this balance might be investigated when he 
emphasizes the importance of investigating social relationships as a 
means of understanding situatedness. 
 
Three intimately linked aspects of the situations of agents are of 
concern in this section. First, we need to establish what is known 
about the primary situational conditions of agents in the form of their 
intersubjective and sodal relationships with other agents. 
 
(p. 197; emphasis added) 
 
(The other two aspects concerns the extent to which these 
relationships are the product of external structures and the 
multidimensional nature of the external environment.) But this 
suggestion is never followed-up or further developed, and indeed 
Oakley almost always substitutes situatedness or the general idea of 
social structure for attention to how individuals exist and act within 
intersubjective relationships with other particular individuals. That is, 
there is no account of the relational aspects of individual life. Indeed 
the closest the book comes to such a discussion is in the treatment of 
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Schutz on social distance. But Schutz's radical subjectivity quickly 
casts most social relationships into the sphere of types, so that there 
is never any real engagement with other individuals in relationships 
which might remove the human agent from a state of existential 
isolation. Thus, situatedness ends up being simply a more 
philosophical conception of constraint on individuals with at best 
incidental connection to what is specifically social in individual life. This 
seems to argue against Oakley's original strategy of seeking to 
establish what is distinctive about human agency apart from social 
interaction. It does not, however, argue against the idea of an 
ontological point of view, since social embeddedness and the relational 
character of life is no less an existential reality than the need to act in 
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